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First-Person Propositions| old_uid | 11252 |
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| title | First-Person Propositions |
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| start_date | 2012/04/06 |
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| schedule | 16h30-18h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | A first-person proposition is a proposition that is accessible to only
a single subject, in the sense that only that subject can judge or assert that
proposition. Many philosophers are skeptical about first-person propositions,
despite the fact that they would solve problems about de se belief. Here I
show how to make sense of first-person propositions without relying on
first-person Fregean senses or anything else in the vicinity, such as
individual essences or haecceities. The view is a development of the more
general idea that propositions are types of spoken and mental actions. On this
account, first-person propositions are certain types of actions we perform when
we make utterances using the first-person pronoun 'I'. |
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| responsibles | Murez, Hanks |
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