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Application de la théorie sensorimotrice de la conscience à l'étude du ressenti des couleurs| old_uid | 11331 |
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| title | Application de la théorie sensorimotrice de la conscience à l'étude du ressenti des couleurs |
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| start_date | 2012/05/03 |
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| schedule | 13h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | my main interest is one particular aspect of the problem of consciousness, namely the what it's like" of sensory experience: why red seems red to us rather than seeming, say, green, or like the sound of a bell, or even like nothing at all.Color Spongeman This so-called "phenomenal" aspect of consciousness is considered by philosophers to be the "hard" problem of consciousness, also known as the problem of "qualia". Other questions like the question of why we have selves or why we can become aware of things and use them in our rational actions and thought, are considered not so hard. Most theories of consciousness that neuroscientists talk about concern the second, "easier" form of consciousness. Brain mechanisms like large scale neural integration, feedback, recurrence or synchrony of neural discharges may be able to account for this "easier" type of consciousness. On the other hand, many people think there is a fundamental obstacle in dealing with the "hard" problem of consciousness. There seems to be a kind of "explanatory gap" between the physical mechanisms of the brain and the real, nitty gritty "what it's like" of sensations like red." |
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| responsibles | Madelain |
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