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Real naturalism| old_uid | 11343 |
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| title | Real naturalism |
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| start_date | 2012/05/04 |
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| schedule | 09h15-10h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle Dussane |
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| details | Dans le cadre du cadre du Congrès de la Société de Philosophie Analytique (SOPHA). |
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| summary | Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly
anti-naturalistic. They still favour some sort of reductive approach
to experience (sc conscious experience), although the bedrock of any
remotely realistic naturalism, hence any serious or real naturalism,
is outright non-reductive realism about experience. This is the
bedrock of any real naturalism because the existence of experience is
a certainly known natural fact (it’s the most certainly known general
natural fact). (2) By ‘realism about experience’ I mean real realism
about experience. What is real realism about experience? Real realists
about experience take experience to be essentially what they took it
to be before they did any philosophy, e.g. when they were 6 years old.
(3) Physicalism is the view that concrete reality is entirely
physical in nature. I take physicalism to be part of naturalism, so I
take it that experience is entirely physical. (4) Obviously
physicalist naturalism rules out anything incompatible with the truths
of physics, but there’s a crucial respect in which physics only gives
structural information about the nature of concrete reality and has
nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the concrete reality in
so far as its intrinsic nature is more than its structure. (5) It
follows that physicalist naturalism can’t rule out panpsychism or
panexperientialism, which is the simplest theory of the nature of
reality. (6) There is in fact zero evidence for the existence of any
non-experiential reality, so truly hard-nosed physicalism has no
reason to posit its existence, although it must admit the existence of
the certainly known natural fact of experience. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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