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Utterance Contents and Implicatures| old_uid | 11444 |
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| title | Utterance Contents and Implicatures |
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| start_date | 2012/05/25 |
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| schedule | 10h30-13h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle C |
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| details | Séminaire d'Epistémologie des Sciences Cognitives en association avec le laboratoire Langage cerveau cognition (CNRS, Lyon). |
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| summary | Presentation and Discussion of Critical Pragmatics. An Inquiry into Reference and Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011by Kepa Korta and John Perry.
Professor Kepa Korta will introduce the session with the following talk:
Grice’s imposes at least two requirements on the concept of what is said. On the one hand, he takes it to correspond with the usual concept, among linguists and philosophers, of what is said by a speaker by uttering a sentence, aka the proposition expressed, the truth-conditions, the content, or the literal meaning. On the other hand, Grice takes what is said to be one of the critical items, perhaps the main item to be used in the ‘calculation’ of what the speaker implicates by her utterance; or, as it is often called, the input for the inference of implicatures by the hearer. In this paper, we’ll argue that these are incompatible roles for a single content to play. Either you take what is said to be the proposition expressed by the utterance or you consider it to be the input for the inference of implicatures, but not both. If we are right, the relevant content for the inference of implicatures is not limited to a single kind of content, but can be any of a variety of contents that differ in various ways from what is said. In other words, Grice’s theory needs various forms of contents and not just what is said. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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