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Evolutionary Competition between Adjustment Processes in Oligopoly Games| old_uid | 11464 |
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| title | Evolutionary Competition between Adjustment Processes in Oligopoly Games |
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| start_date | 2016/06/09 |
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| schedule | 17h-19h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | We introduce evolutionary competition between adjustment processes in the Cournot oligopoly model. Our main focus is on rational play versus a general short-memory adaptive adjustment process. We find that, although rational play has a stabilizing influence, a sufficient increase in the number of firms in the market tends to make the Cournot-Nash equilibrium unstable. Moreover, the interaction between adjustment processes naturally leads to the emergence of complicated endogenous fluctuations as the number of firms increases, even when demand and costs are linear.
Il s'agit d'un travail en collaboration avec Cars Hommes et Jan Tuinstra. |
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| responsibles | Baccelli |
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