|
Real direct realism (apparentism)| old_uid | 11527 |
|---|
| title | Real direct realism (apparentism) |
|---|
| start_date | 2012/06/15 |
|---|
| schedule | 11h-13h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| summary | Direct realism is true, when properly understood.
Descartes and Arnauld are good guides, although their writings are
open to different interpretations. (2) The issue of the truth or
falsity of direct realism must be kept scrupulously apart from the
issue of scepticism regarding an external world: any version of direct
realism that permit the refutation of scepticism about the external
world—either scepticism about its existence, or about our knowledge of
its nature—is ipso facto refuted. (3) No defensible version of direct
realism denies the existence of existents that can be correctly called
‘mental representations’ (nb this claim is compatible with Arnauld’s
fierce rejection of ‘êtres représentatifs’). (4) Direct realism
neither requires nor entails ‘disjunctivism’, and ‘disjunctivism’
neither requires nor entails direct realism. (5) Direct realism does
not require the truth of ‘transparentism’, and is incompatible with
transparentism when ‘transparent’ is understood in the most natural
way. (6) There is some truth in the doctrine of transparentism, but we
need to distinguish the Moore version from the Reid-James version. (7)
Furthermore, a defensible version of transparentism must acknowledge
(i) the sense in which we are aware of our sensations in conscious
perceptual experience, and necessarily so, and (ii) the fact that we
are in everyday life often aware of our experiences considered
specifically as such, even as we are in direct perceptual contact with
objects. |
|---|
| responsibles | Lesguillons |
|---|
| |
|