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A Theory of Preferences Built on Fundamental Psychological Principles| old_uid | 11687 |
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| title | A Theory of Preferences Built on Fundamental Psychological Principles |
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| start_date | 2012/10/05 |
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| schedule | 11h-12h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle des Voûtes, FR3C |
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| summary | Most theories of decision making describe preferences in terms of underlying utility functions (i.e., stable representations of value), while remaining largely agnostic about the specific cognitive processes that drive these preferences. However, in order to fully understand the determinants and moderators of valuation and choice we need to develop (and test) process-level theories of decision making. In this talk, I describe our efforts to develop such a theory and to test its predictions. This novel framework, which we call ?Decision-by-Sampling? (DbS) theory, capitalizes on parallels between perception and decision-making. DbS uses fundamental psychological principles to explain how people evaluate decision attributes and ultimately construct their preferences. I start by describing DbS and how it derives preferences from a small set of simple, yet well-established, cognitive operations. A central implication of DbS is that evaluations (and, by extension, preferences) are fundamentally relative, and they emerge from a series of comparisons with exemplars sampled from memory. Next, I describe several strands of research designed to test the various implications and predictions of DbS. I show how DbS can explain a wide variety of empirical phenomena in several decision making domains. These studies show that DbS can simultaneously explain certain context effects, framing effects, individual differences, and cross-cultural differences. I will conclude my presentation by discussing the broader implications of DbS for understanding (and modeling) preferences. |
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| responsibles | Pélissier |
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