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Deflationism about incompleteness and the omega-rule| old_uid | 12342 |
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| title | Deflationism about incompleteness and the omega-rule |
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| start_date | 2013/04/15 |
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| schedule | 17h30-19h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Grande Salle |
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| summary | We give a negative answer to the question of whether our conviction about the truth of the Gödel sentence G involves a theory of truth beyond the deflationary theories. After discussing and dismissing Neil Tennant's deflationary view of incompleteness, we show how a new deflationary account of the incompletability of formal systems can be framed in the setting of Peano Arithmetic augmented to include a constructive version of the omega-rule based on the notion of prototypical proof. As a consequence, the ur-inflationary idea that any demonstrative method non-formalisable within Peano Arithmetic has to be epistemologically stronger than the methods encompassed by Peano Arithmetic is shown to be flawed. |
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| responsibles | Pataut, Dubucs, Panza |
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