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Cognition Embodied, Extended and Enacted: Back Together Again| old_uid | 12351 |
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| title | Cognition Embodied, Extended and Enacted: Back Together Again |
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| start_date | 2013/04/16 |
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| schedule | 15h-17h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle F 101 |
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| summary | Influential arguments of Andy Clark have convinced many that the theses of embodied and extended cognition are dubiously compatible. According to Clark, the thesis of extended cognition is, in essence, a functionalist thesis, and such functionalism is anathema to the thesis of embodied cognition. In this paper, I shall defend an account of mental processes that is both embodied and extended – and also recognizably enactivist. At the core of this account is an analysis of intentionality as revealing activity – an analysis that owes much to work in the early phenomenological and analytic traditions. |
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| responsibles | Roy |
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