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The Value of Cognitive Phenomenology| old_uid | 12489 |
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| title | The Value of Cognitive Phenomenology |
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| start_date | 2013/05/24 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In this paper I explore the prospects of establishing the existence of phenomenology distinctive of thought—i.e. irreducible cognitive phenomenology—on the basis of claims about the existence of values distinctive of thought—e.g. Mill’s “higher pleasures.” I argue that though some attempts fail and some succeed but suffer from dialectical weakness, there is at least one route that is both successful and dialectically satisfactory. In the course of the argument I take up a number of issues of recent interest, such as defining cognitive phenomenology, the status of claims about differences in value, and the relationship between value and phenomenology. |
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| responsibles | Lesguillons |
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