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Causal reasoning, causal probabilities, and conceptions of causation| old_uid | 12684 |
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| title | Causal reasoning, causal probabilities, and conceptions of causation |
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| start_date | 2013/06/27 |
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| schedule | 14h30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | The present paper deals with the tools that can be used to represent causation and to reason about it and, specifically, with their diversity. It focuses on so-called “causal probabilities”—that is, probabilities of effects given one of their causes—and critically surveys a recent paper in which Joyce (2010) argues that the values of these probabilities do not depend on one’s conception of causation. I first establish a stronger independence claim: I show that the very definition of causal probabilities is independent of one’s conception of causation. Second, I investigate whether causal probabilities indeed take the same values under their different possible definitions. |
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| responsibles | Proust |
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