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Mentalism vs behaviourism in economics: a philosophy of sciences perspectives| old_uid | 12715 |
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| title | Mentalism vs behaviourism in economics: a philosophy of sciences perspectives |
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| start_date | 2013/07/10 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-
scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behavioural dis-
positions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent
than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as elec-
trons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion
in psychology and linguistics, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘re-
vealed preference’ theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common confusions about
the two views, (ii) situate the debate in a historical context, and (iii) defend a men-
talist approach to economics. Setting aside normative concerns about behaviourism,
we show that mentalism is in line with best scientific practice even if economics is
treated as a purely positive science of economic behaviour. We distinguish men-
talism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be
explained in terms of people’s brain processes, as distinct from their mental states. |
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| responsibles | Zuber |
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