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Does the explanatory gap really arise from a fallacy?| old_uid | 12784 |
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| title | Does the explanatory gap really arise from a fallacy? |
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| start_date | 2017/02/07 |
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| schedule | 10h30-12h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the “explanatory gap”, or the “intuition of distinctness” (the persistent impression that phenomenal states cannot be identical with physical states), as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion.
Most of the debates on the issue have been focused on the question of knowing whether this intuition of distinctness really is an illusion, or whether instead it tells us something real about the nature of our experiences. However, from a physicalist point of view, it is also relevant to ask whether the psychological process that leads to the explanatory gap can be plausibly understood as a fallacy, or if it is better described as the result of another kind of illusion (for example, a perceptual-like illusion).
I will compare the process that gives rise to the intuition of distinctness with the process underlying typical fallacies, and I will show that this comparison weighs against interpreting this intuition as the result of a fallacy. I will make clear that this does not give us an argument against physicalism per se, but that this has consequences on the kind of physicalism we should embrace.weighs against interpreting this intuition as the result of a fallacy. I will make clear that this does not give us an argument against physicalism per se, but that this has consequences on the kind of physicalism we should embrace. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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