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Intuition and induction| old_uid | 12951 |
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| title | Intuition and induction |
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| start_date | 2013/10/28 |
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| schedule | 17h30-19h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In his recent book Mathematical Thought and its Objects, Charles
Parsons argues that the principle of induction is not intuitive
knowledge, and that many inductively definedoperations are not
intuitive. In both cases, Brouwer held the opposite view. In this
talk, I will compare Parsons'argument to Brouwer's and defend the
latter. I will not argue that Parsons is wrong once his own
conception of intuition is granted, as I do not think that that is the
case. But I will try to make two points. The first is that Husserl's
analyses of time awareness can be used to justify in some detail
Brouwer's claim that the principle of induction and inductively
defined operations are intuitive. The second is that there are
certain elements in Parsons' discussion that, when developed further, would lead to Brouwer's notion thus analysed, or at least something relevantly similar to it. |
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| responsibles | Pataut, Dubucs, Panza |
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