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Non-classical truth-judgments: vagueness and presuppositions| old_uid | 13453 |
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| title | Non-classical truth-judgments: vagueness and presuppositions |
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| start_date | 2014/02/14 |
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| schedule | 16h-17h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | One classically judges sentences either "true'' or "false''. But some sentences seem to resist this binary judgment. I focus on vague sentences (a) and presuppositional sentences (b).
a. The oven is hot
b. The oven has stopped buzzing
When faced with an oven at a moderate temperature, speakers might judge (a) "neither true nor false''. Literature on presuppositions usually describes (b) as "neither true nor false'' in cases where the oven has never been buzzing.
I collected truth-judgments about these two types of sentences in critical situations: my predictions are that speakers won't judge any of the two "completely true'' nor "completely false'', but that they still won't give the exact same judgments for the two.
I then plan to conduct further experiments to look at what I call "hybrid sentences'', e.g. (c) in cases where the oven was at a moderate temperature before cooling down:
c. The oven has stopped being hot |
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| responsibles | Strickland |
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