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Reference and Predication in Pictorial Representation| old_uid | 13462 |
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| title | Reference and Predication in Pictorial Representation |
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| start_date | 2014/02/17 |
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| schedule | 11h-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | How do pictorial images express their content? Linguistic content arises, in the simplest case, when a sentence expresses the predication of a property to a referent. In the first part of this talk, I defend the familiar view that pictorial content also involves the attribution of properties to referents. Thus a given picture might depict Obama (the referent) as lifting his arm (the property). Unfortunately for this otherwise plausible account, the format of pictorial representation resists any neat structural division into subject and predicate, in the manner of language or logic. How then is predicative pictorial content possible? In the second part of the talk, I extract a “baseline” semantics for iconic representations that answers this challenge, drawn from various recent accounts of pictures, maps, and diagrams. Put simply: such images do not mark a structural distinction between subject and predicate. Instead, the very same features both refer to individual objects and express the properties ascribed to these objects. In the final part of the talk, I show how this baseline semantics must be extended to account for the essential role of perspective or viewpoint in pictorial representation. |
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| responsibles | Giardino |
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