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The Phenomenology of Particularity and Mental Files| old_uid | 13528 |
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| title | The Phenomenology of Particularity and Mental Files |
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| start_date | 2014/03/03 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Our experience of the world is not purely qualitative. We perceive objects as particular individuals. The problem of particularity is how to account for this fundamental phenomenological fact. A similar problem arises at the level of conceptual thought. Singular thoughts are thoughts that are directly about particular individual objects. According to Bach (2010), the problem of particularity and the problem of singular thought are “in relevant respects ... pretty much the same problem.” If so, perhaps they have pretty much the same solution? In this presentation, I explore the possibility of using the recently popular mental file framework (Recanati 2012) to address both problems. I argue that we should distinguish between the particularity of perception and the singularity of thought rather more carefully than Bach seems to suggest. This distinction raises some thorny issues for file enthusiasts, issues which concern the relation between the phenomenology of perception and rational thought. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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