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Vagueness, Normativity, and Belief| old_uid | 13596 |
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| title | Vagueness, Normativity, and Belief |
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| start_date | 2014/03/13 |
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| schedule | 13h30-15h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | RdC, salle de réunion |
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| summary | Some theorists of vagueness think that the predicate 'belief' is vague (e.g., Hilpinen 1980, Hajek 2014). I think that 'belief' probably is vague, though for reasons different from the ones usually cited. In particular, on the conception of vagueness that I favor, 'belief' is vague primarily because its application is arbitrary over a certain range of cases, not because it is "sorites-susceptible" or admits of borderline cases. I discuss some implications of the latter view for the nature of belief and the practice of belief ascription. |
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| responsibles | Proust, Égré |
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