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The social Bayesian brain: does mentalizing make a difference when we learn?| old_uid | 13796 |
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| title | The social Bayesian brain: does mentalizing make a difference when we learn? |
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| start_date | 2014/04/07 |
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| schedule | 11h |
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| online | no |
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| details | Invité par Yves Agid |
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| summary | A defining feature of human social cognition is our insight that others' behaviour is driven by their beliefs and preferences, rather than by what is objectively true or good for them. In fact, a great deal of our social interactions is concerned with guessing others' mental states. But is such "mentalizing" of any help for predicting others' behaviour? After all, most animal species seem to cope with this problem without appealing to any form of sophisticated "Theory of Mind". Here, sophistication refers to the depth of recursive beliefs, as in "I think that you think that I think...". Although we are likely to engage in such recursive beliefs whenever our interests are tied up with others' (e.g. in the aim of deceiving them), it is unclear how these beliefs are updated and whether this gives us any advantage when we learn. These are the questions we address in this work, by combining computational models with experimental investigations of mentalizing in competitive social interactions in both human and non-human primates. |
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| responsibles | Agid |
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