Do non-linguistic creatures have a Fodorian language of thought?

old_uid14006
titleDo non-linguistic creatures have a Fodorian language of thought?
start_date2014/05/20
schedule12h-13h30
onlineno
location_infosalle 235A
summaryPhilosophers have debated whether some non-linguistic creatures (complex non-human animals/prelinguistic infants) form conceptual representations with propositional content, with a language/like, logic/like combinatorial structure. Some have argued that the answer is clearly NO (Davidson, Bermudez) whereas others have argued that the answer is clearly YES (Fodor). Clearly, this is an empirical question. Taking two case studies (logical connectives; especially not and or, and the abstract relational concepts same and different), I explore how to bring empirical data to bear on this question as well as begin to explore what the question comes to.
responsiblesSackur