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What is the hard problem of consciousness?| old_uid | 14230 |
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| title | What is the hard problem of consciousness? |
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| start_date | 2014/06/23 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | The hard problem of consciousness, though widely discussed, is surprisingly difficult to pin down. A brief history of the problem ultimately reveals that ‘the’ hard problem can be, and in fact often is, a confused mélange of related but distinct problems, all having to do with phenomenal consciousness.
Here, after supplying this brief history (§1), I argue that the hard problem is in fact a single and well-defined problem. Specifically, the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining at least one phenomenally conscious state in terms of that which is not phenomenally conscious. After arguing for this -- I think very innocent -- thesis (§2), I distinguish the hard problem from related but distinct problems and I explain how a proper understanding of the hard problem ought to revolutionize our approach to phenomenal consciousness as an object of study (§3). A proper understanding of the hard problem may provide, to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase, the way out of the fly-bottle. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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