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The Sense of Agency As Cognitive Phenomenology| old_uid | 14420 |
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| title | The Sense of Agency As Cognitive Phenomenology |
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| start_date | 2014/10/06 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In this talk, I will make a case for understanding the sense of agency, i.e., the awareness of oneself as acting, as a form of cognitive phenomenology. To start, I will clarify what it means for the sense of agency to have a phenomenological component, and motivate the claim that there is one. Next, I will argue on the basis of empirical evidence that, at least sometimes, the sense of agency arises from psychological states that are antecedent to bodily movement. I will then describe and evaluate two possible models for the sense of agency given this constraint: the intention-based model, on which intentions themselves are the states in virtue of which one has a sense of agency, and the inferential model, on which it is in virtue of inferences based on intentions that one does. I will argue in favor of the inferential model, which entails that the mental states in virtue of which we are aware of ourselves as acting are inferential first-personal thoughts, and further detail how such a view can account for key aspects of agentive phenomenology, revealing it to be a type of cognitive phenomenology. I will close by highlighting some additional explanatory virtues of this account of the sense of agency. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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