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An Indeterminacy in the Contents of Perception| old_uid | 14591 |
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| title | An Indeterminacy in the Contents of Perception |
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| start_date | 2014/11/06 |
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| schedule | 11h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | According to generalists, neither the contents nor the accuracy conditions of our perceptual experiences are constituted by the objects we perceive. Particularists disagree. According to some, this is because the objects we perceive enter into the contents of our perceptual experiences, whereas, according to others, it’s because they enter into the accuracy conditions (but not the contents) of our perceptual experiences. I argue that neither side of the debate is right. What the generalist and the particularist are providing us with are equally acceptable ways of assigning contents to our perceptual experiences. In other words, it's simply indeterminate whether the objects we perceive are represented by our perceptual experiences. I make my case by arguing that the generalist and the particularist are equally well placed to explain various key phenomena. Moreover, I argue that my account also provides the most straightforward explanation of the fact that our intuitions pull in the direction of both object-independent and object-dependent content assignments. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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