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A defense of the content criterion for individuating the senses| old_uid | 14592 |
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| title | A defense of the content criterion for individuating the senses |
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| start_date | 2014/11/06 |
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| schedule | 15h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | The senses are faculties that allow gathering information about the environment. Various facts about multisensory integration at the neural level and about crossmodal interaction at the behavioural level have led philosophers to reconsider the question how the senses are to be distinguished or individuated. In this talk, I shall begin by specifying the nature of the problem of individuation of the senses and by determining certain methodological constraints a theory of sense individuation should satisfy. Next, I will present and discuss the main criteria of individuation offered by Grice in 1962, and will claim that the content criterion, according to which the senses are to be individuated in terms of the environmental properties or objects they give access to, is the only one that can withstand scrutiny. One important implication of this claim is that one should accept that there are as many sense modalities as there are classes of environmental properties or objects. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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