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Contextualism About Object-Perception| old_uid | 14738 |
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| title | Contextualism About Object-Perception |
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| start_date | 2014/12/01 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | According to the received view, whether a subject, S, counts as seeing a given object, O, is determined solely by which relations hold between S's visual experience and O (e.g. causal ones). I argue that the received view is wrong: whether S can truly be said to see O varies with the interests of those attributing her state of seeing. Having provided a number of supporting cases, I bolster my contextualist account by arguing that ‘sees’ is a gradable verb, and that it can be grouped along with other gradable terms that are widely seen as context-sensitive (e.g. ‘tall’, ‘empty’, ‘flat’). I then examine the consequences that the context-sensitivity of ‘sees’ has for the nature of perceptual experience. Finally, I argue that the notion of seeing deployed in vision science is not immune to this context-sensitivity. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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