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Epistemic feelings and thought awareness: a projective view of cognitive phenomenology| old_uid | 14785 |
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| title | Epistemic feelings and thought awareness: a projective view of cognitive phenomenology |
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| start_date | 2017/11/24 |
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| schedule | 11h30-13h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Cognitive phenomenology (CP) refers to the experience one has when performing cognitive actions, such as exchanging ideas, planning a trip, trying to remember a name, or solving a problem. It will be argued that CP has two forms, which are determined by two crucial functions of conscious awareness of one's own cognitive actions. Task-indexing imagery has the function of maintaining executive attention focused on the present informational goal until fully completed. Activity-dependent noetic feelings have the function of evaluating on-line the feasibility and correctness of cognitive actions. Conceptual and empirical arguments in favour of this functional duality of CP will be discussed. A projection theory of the role of sensory information in cognitive phenomenology will be defended. This theory purports to explain why task-indexes and epistemic feelings have a sensory vehicle but are felt as expressing respectively intended goal (e.g. proving that P) and graded epistemic opportunities (feasibility) or outcome properties (relevance, coherence, truth, etc.). |
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| responsibles | Lesguillons |
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