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The « defective » truth table : Its past, present, and future| old_uid | 14841 |
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| title | The « defective » truth table : Its past, present, and future |
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| start_date | 2014/12/17 |
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| schedule | 09h10 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In the so-called « defective » truth table, a conditional, if p then q, is held to be true in the p & q cell, false in the p & not-q cell, and to have some other, third value in the not-p cells. Wason (1966) was the first psychologist to refer to what came to be known as the « defective » truth table, although he did not use the term « defective » for it. Johnson-Laird & Tagard (1969) said more about it, and noted that it had been proposed earlier by the philosophers Quine (1959) and Kneale & Kneale (1969). Johnson-Laird & Wason (1970) appear to have been the first psychologists to use the term « defective » for the table. We will point out that this table was proposed much earlier by de Finetti (1936) and discuss why it should be called the « de Finetti » table. We will also address a surprisingly neglected question in the psychology of reasoning, « What exactly is the third value ? » We will quickly summarize our recent research which interprets the third value as uncertainty. We will argue that future research should refine this notion of uncertainty into degrees of probability. The new focus should be on the « Jeffrey » table, in which the uncertainty value in the not-p cells becomes the conditional probability of q given p, P(q|p). |
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| responsibles | Baratgin |
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