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Social motivation and early false-belief understanding| old_uid | 14958 |
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| title | Social motivation and early false-belief understanding |
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| start_date | 2015/01/21 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | First, I will sketch a pragmatic solution to the puzzle about early belief ascription: young children fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but they demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. I will argue that what makes the standard where-prediction question so taxing for children before the age of four is that it simultaneously requires them to take a third-person perspective on the mistaken agent’s instrumental action, while taking a second-person perspective on the experimenter’s communicative action.
Secondly, in support of this view, I will present novel empirical data showing that 3-year-olds succeed in social versions of the elicited-response false-belief task in which they are asked to take a second-person perspective onto the instrumental action of a mistaken agent. Finally, I will present preliminary data exploring a group paradigm in 3-year-olds: While both, group-membership based on shared beliefs and preferences lead to an in-group bias, young children do not show any group effect when their membership has been assigned randomly. |
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| responsibles | Strickland |
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