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A Normative Interpretation of Epistemic Game Theory?| old_uid | 15190 |
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| title | A Normative Interpretation of Epistemic Game Theory? |
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| start_date | 2015/03/05 |
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| schedule | 17h-19h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle Séminaire |
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| details | (en collaboration avec Eric Pacuit). |
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| summary | In the last fifteen years the co-called "epistemic program" in game theory has made important headway into pinpointing conditions under which traditional Bayesian rationality will recommend agents to play according to traditional solution concepts for games. Can this provide a normative foundation of game theory? In this talk I will argue for a qualified "yes". I will first argue that, for methodological reasons, epistemic game theory does not inherit the generality of traditional normative arguments for Bayesian rationality. It only applies to rather special cases. I will then argue that even in these cases current characterizations of traditional solution concepts do not fare so well from a normative point of view. But I will finally argue that, nonetheless, the general approach of epistemic game theory is on the right track for providing a theory of rationality in games, and show one example of how this can be done. |
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| responsibles | Baccelli |
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