|
Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions| old_uid | 15333 |
|---|
| title | Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions |
|---|
| start_date | 2015/03/20 |
|---|
| schedule | 11h30-13h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| summary | Ascriptions of belief and knowledge give rise to the so-called epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE). Epistemic state ascriptions, that is, vary across scenarios depending on whether an action’s side-effect is positive or negative. In a series of experiments, I investigate whether this asymmetry is influenced by perspective. More generally, the question is whether knowledge and belief ascriptions differ when people assess their own epistemic states rather than those of other people in otherwise indistinguishable scenarios. Belief ascriptions, it turns out, do manifest an impact of perspective: In contrast to other-ascriptions, self-ascriptions of belief do not give rise to an ESEE. Knowledge ascriptions, astonishingly, do not vary with perspective. |
|---|
| responsibles | Strickland |
|---|
| |
|