|
Personal Memories| old_uid | 15375 |
|---|
| title | Personal Memories |
|---|
| start_date | 2015/03/25 |
|---|
| schedule | 16h-18h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| details | Commentator: Tiziana Zalla (CNRS, IJN) |
|---|
| summary | In this talk, I will present two of the main theses I defended in my doctoral dissertation. The first one is that personal memories are representations, which can be internal and thus purely mental, or can be the result of a coupling between internal resources and external representations, or can even be embodied; but they are always representations. Arguing in favor of a representationalist conceptualization of personal memories supposes two tasks: first, to show that the rival theory, that is, direct realism in all its different versions, do not constitute a good explanatory account of the personal memory phenomena; and second, that representationalism do constitute a better framework to understand personal memories. These are the two tasks I undertake in the first part of the talk: after analyzing some objections that direct realism cannot satisfactory face, I present then a version of representationalism based on the distinction between content, intentional object and ontological object of our memory representations that does not show the same kind of problems, mainly because it is compatible with a naturalist and scientific explanation of memory.
Personal memories are thus representations about our past. But in which sense are these memories personal? That is, in which sense past events are apprehended as being past events that have been personally experienced by the rememberer? The answer to this question corresponds to the second main thesis of my dissertation: that in our personal memories, even if they are about external past events, the self is in certain way always present and represented, more substantially through the emotional aspects related with the past remembered. In this second part of the talk, I propose an analysis of the different forms that these emotional aspects can take in a personal memory, against the natural assumption that they can be either an occurrent and present emotion or just a simple propositional memory of the emotion experienced in the past. |
|---|
| responsibles | Bantegnie |
|---|
| |
|