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Colours as dependent stuffs| old_uid | 15446 |
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| title | Colours as dependent stuffs |
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| start_date | 2015/04/03 |
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| schedule | 11h30-13h |
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| online | no |
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| details | Co-colloquium conjointement avec le séminaire "Reality & Representation" |
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| summary | Although the metaphysical status of phenomenal colours is a matter of continuing disagreement, there is a consensus about the ontological category to which they belong. Primitivists, physicalists, dispositionalists, subjectivists, etc., all agree that colors are properties. I shall maintain instead that colours belong the category of stuffs. Only if colors are stuffs can we understand (i) that colours-terms are mass-terms (ii) that colours fill space (iii) that colours can be mixed (iv) and perhaps, that colours are ordered in a quality space. The grain of truth, in the property-view, however, is that colours are ontologically dependent entities: colours require extension. Colours then belong to the neglected category of dependent stuffs. |
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| responsibles | Schlenker |
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