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The disunity of science in the image of grounding : two approaches| old_uid | 15477 |
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| title | The disunity of science in the image of grounding : two approaches |
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| start_date | 2015/04/08 |
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| schedule | 14h-30-16h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Grounding discourse is a philosophical language game composed of sentences like these: “Mental facts are grounded in neurophysiological facts.” “It is true that snow is white because snow is white.” “Mona Lisa is beautiful because of its natural properties.” “Modal properties cannot be fundamental and, therefore, must be grounded.” “Legal facts are grounded in social facts”, etc. Grounding realism, the characteristic of which is that it takes grounding sentences at their face value, is the dominant interpretation of grounding discourse (its main proponents are people like Kit Fine, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Rosen, Karen Bennett, Fabrice Correia). The popularity of grounding realism in contemporary metaphysics can be partly explained by the fact that it gives rise to a middle view in the reductionist vs. anti-reductionist debate about the relationship between levels of organisation in empirical reality: the physical, the biological, the psychological, etc. But the belief that such a middle view is welcome and fruitful appears to be based on an implicit belief in some vertical metaphysical unity between levels of organisation, a belief which finds its origin in the long unity of science tradition. The grounding realist’s belief that such a vertical unity is a good thing contrasts with central claims of the disunity of science movement or the pluralist stance that is gaining popularity and acceptance among philosophers of science (among proponents of this movement we find Patrick Suppes, Ian Hacking, John Dupré, Nancy Cartwright, and many others). Proponents of the pluralist stance do not only claim that the assumption of vertical metaphysical unity is unwarranted on empirical grounds, they also claim that abandoning this dogma yields a more fruitful interdisciplinary approach to scientific debates. My aim in this talk is to compare the consequences of grounding realism and the disunity of science movement when it comes to levels of organisation in empirical reality and to criticise grounding realism on this basis. By means of a case study in the pluralist literature (the mind/body problem as discussed by C. Wade Savage) I shall also argue that the pluralist stance is compatible with a fruitful appeal to grounding discourse regarding the relationship between levels of organisation. But using grounding discourse in this fruitful way requires us to abandon the realist interpretation of it and to favour an alternative understanding of it. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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