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Quantum logic meets logical pluralism| old_uid | 15583 |
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| title | Quantum logic meets logical pluralism |
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| start_date | 2015/05/04 |
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| schedule | 17h30-19h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | In a classic paper, Putnam suggested that we have good empirical
reasons for adopting a (non-distributive) quantum logic as the 'true
logic', and that the classical logical connectives are the quantum
loigical connectives 'in disguise'. While very few believe that this
move would solve the paradoxes of quantum mechanics, Putnam's paper is
still interesting for the debate on logical monism vs pluralism.
Recently, this debate has been steered in a new direction by J.C.
Beall and Greg Restall, whose logical pluralism is a pluralism about
logical validity. Thus for instance they take the difference between
classical and intuitionist logic to lie not in the meaning of the
logical connectives, but in the different standards of proof (in their
formal apparatus, different 'precisifications of cases' in the
'generalised Tarski thesis'). Both approaches share the feature that
in different logics the meaning of the connectives is the same, but
this is cashed out by Putnam in terms of monism (and revisionism), by
Beall and Restall in terms of pluralism. This talk will provide a
viable formal apparatus for Putnam's claim (comparable to Beall and
Restall's) and suggest that both Putnam and Beall and Restall could be
read in either monist or pluralist terms. |
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| responsibles | Pataut, Panza |
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