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Pain, pleasure and value in a world without consciousness| old_uid | 15669 |
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| title | Pain, pleasure and value in a world without consciousness |
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| start_date | 2018/05/14 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Many people think that phenomenal states (and more particularly valenced phenomenal states, such as pain and pleasure) ground some important kind of value. For example, they think that our lives are valuable only because we are phenomenally conscious : were we to become phenomenal zombies, our lives would lose most, if not all of their value. They may also think that the instantiation of valenced phenomenal states, such as phenomenal pleasure or phenomenal pain, has some kind of intrinsic value (positive or negative), which is such that creatures able to enter these states (sentient creatures) hence possess some specific rights.
Such claims linking phenomenality to value are quite common, and maybe also quite intuitive. One may therefore wonder : what happens to the value of our lives, or to the rights of sentient creatures, if eliminativism regarding phenomenal consciousness is true - if there are no phenomenal states ? I will try to answer this question. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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