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Fundamentality without foundations| old_uid | 15708 |
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| title | Fundamentality without foundations |
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| start_date | 2015/06/01 |
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| schedule | 16h-18h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim that the fundamental just is the foundational. The puzzle is typically resolved by rejecting the first or second claim, perhaps because it is obscure how the third claim might plausibly be challenged. But I develop a new analysis of fundamentality which surprisingly reveals that an entity might be fundamental without being foundational. The possibility of fundamentality without foundations not only provides for a novel resolution to the puzzle, but has applications to some live debates: for example, it shows that Jonathan Schaffer’s modal argument for priority monism is unsound. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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