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Context Sensitive Rationality and the Construction of Attitudes| old_uid | 15771 |
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| title | Context Sensitive Rationality and the Construction of Attitudes |
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| start_date | 2015/06/10 |
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| schedule | 14h-16h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | RdC, salle 235C |
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| summary | Two concepts have been at the heart of our behavioral sciences and their understanding of our mind in reasoning, deciding and acting: rationality and attitudes. These two fundamental concepts of analysis have always been seen as being closely linked. However, developments of our understanding of human rationality and reasoning during the last decades have yet failed to make a deep impact upon how to model our building bricks for mental explanations: attitudes such as beliefs and preferences. In this talk I shall consider implications of pluralism in the theory of rationality for attitude theory and for the idea that attitudes are subject to rationality constraints. If, as I am going to argue, context-sensitivity holds as a meta-norm for rationality, this entails a demand for context-sensitivity also on the level of attitudes. This demand creates tensions with the naïve internalist realism in the representationalist, functionalist and dispositionalist orthodoxies that have been dominating in the philosophy of mind. It appears that context-sensitivity creates a pressure to take constructionism more seriously also in the metaphysics of propositional attitudes. |
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| responsibles | Proust, Égré |
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