Pluralistic Decision Theory

old_uid15772
titlePluralistic Decision Theory
start_date2015/06/10
schedule16h30-18h30
onlineno
location_infoRdC, salle 235C
summaryThis paper is about two disputes in decision theory—a familiar dispute between evidential and causal approaches to decision theory, and an unfamiliar dispute between monistic and pluralistic approaches to decision theory. The dispute between evidential and causal approaches to decision theory is about whether we need to invoke explicitly causal notions in an adequate decision theory. The dispute between monistic and pluralistic approaches to decision theory is less familiar. Decision-theoretic monists think that there is a single value quantity—expected value—that governs rational decision-making. Though monists disagree with one another about what kind of expected value governs rational decision-making, they are united in their belief that there is a single value quantity that all agents are rationally required to maximize. Decision-theoretic pluralists disagree, maintaining that different agents are rationally required to maximize different value quantities. Although almost all proponents of evidential decision theory champion the monistic form of the view, we shall argue that the pluralistic form is superior, and although almost all proponents of causal decision theory champion the monistic form of the view, we shall argue that the pluralistic form is superior.
responsiblesProust, Égré