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A constructivist approach to Consciousness| old_uid | 16019 |
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| title | A constructivist approach to Consciousness |
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| start_date | 2018/06/15 |
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| schedule | 16h-17h30 |
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| online | no |
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| details | Commentator: Uriah Kriegel |
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| summary | Constructivism is an epistemological position which defends the idea that knowledge about reality is the result of the construction and verification of mental models about the world. I aim to show how this approach reframes controversies on the nature of consciousness and its scientific study. To do so, I introduce a dynamic inferential model of knowledge acquisition in line with constructivist principles. Applying this framework to consciousness, I show how the commitments (ie. reductionism, dualism and enactivism) underlying influential scientific approaches to consciousness are the result of a focus on different stages of the knowledge acquisition process. Rather than conflicting methodologies, I argue for their synergic functions in the construction of the notion of consciousness.
Based on these results, I underline some promising avenues for the development of the scientific understanding of consciousness. I propose moreover a draft for a psychological construction of perceptual consciousness. To do so, I rely on a definition of consciousness endorsed by predictive coding, presenting particular affinities with the constructivist view. I then use this framework to propose a solution to a perceptual formulation of the paradox of mental causation. This solution reject each proposition of the paradox at different stages of the predictive process of perceptual inference. This work does not intend to solve the nature of consciousness per se, which is the product of philosophical and scientific endeavor, but rather offer an epistemological framework which puts in perspective and resolve the philosophical paradoxes and scientific controversies that shape our understanding of consciousness. |
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| responsibles | Lavalle, Carranante |
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