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Growth and Insecure Private Property of Capital| old_uid | 16527 |
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| title | Growth and Insecure Private Property of Capital |
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| start_date | 2018/10/19 |
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| schedule | 11h30 |
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| online | no |
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| summary | This paper revisits Strulik’s model of growth with insecure property rights. In this model different social groups devote some effort to control a share of the capital stock. We show that a slight variation in the modeling of strategic interactions results in the coexistence of savings and efforts to control a share of the capital stock. We also study the effects of a change in the number of social groups, on growth. We also show that an increase in social fractionalization may lead to less effort devoted to control capital and to a higher growth rate. |
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| responsibles | Bachir |
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