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Introspective knowledge by acquaintance| old_uid | 16853 |
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| title | Introspective knowledge by acquaintance |
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| start_date | 2018/12/05 |
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| schedule | 13h-15h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Institut Jean-Nicod |
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| summary | Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is (roughly) knowledge we acquire just in virtue of being directly aware of our experiences. Differently from most contemporary acquaintance theorists, and similarly to Bertrand Russell, I think that knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge : it cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge. In this talk I argue that, although not propositional, knowledge by acquaintance is nonetheless epistemically significant. I propose that there are two main marks of epistemic significance : information acquisition and epistemic evaluability. I show that knowledge by acquaintance displays both marks. Along the way I also argue that knowledge by introspective acquaintance has a special epistemic property, what I call complete and perfect grasp—an epistemic property that, in a sense, is analogous to an epistemic property that has traditionally been attributed to some introspective propositional knowledge, namely, infallibility. I conclude that there are good reasons for thinking that knowledge by acquaintance is epistemically significant. |
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| responsibles | Kriegel |
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