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Propensities and Pragmatism| old_uid | 16898 |
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| title | Propensities and Pragmatism |
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| start_date | 2018/12/03 |
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| schedule | 10h45-12h15 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle de conférence |
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| summary | In this first lecture I outline a general pragmatist conception of propensity and defend it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. I review the paradox, and identify one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis which states that propensities are probabilities (under a suitable interpretation of Kolmogorov’s axioms). I argue that the identity thesis is involved in many empiricist versions of the propensity interpretation deriving from Popper’s original and influential proposal, and makes such interpretations untenable. As an alternative, I offer a version of a pragmatist conception of dispositional probabilities, which rejects the identity thesis. |
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| responsibles | <not specified> |
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