|
Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions| old_uid | 17503 |
|---|
| title | Emotions Inside Out: The Content of Emotions |
|---|
| start_date | 2019/03/22 |
|---|
| schedule | 11h30-13h |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| location_info | rdc, salle de réunion |
|---|
| summary | Most of those who hold that emotions have representational content that is evaluative also accept that the content of emotions are nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for apparent difference between emotions and evaluative judgments. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose to the case of emotions. The paper ends with a discussion of two important worries, that is, firstly, that emotions can only justify evaluative judgements if their content is conceptual, and secondly, that emotions must have conceptual content because they allow for conceptually articulated cognitive bases. |
|---|
| responsibles | Lesguillons |
|---|
| |
|