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Affective Knowledge in Ethics| old_uid | 17603 |
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| title | Affective Knowledge in Ethics |
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| start_date | 2019/03/19 |
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| schedule | 15h-17h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Can anger and frustration place someone in a favourable epistemic position? According to Marilyn Friedman (1986), they can: our affective states constitute epistemic touchstones, which allow for the assessments of one’s moral principles. What is the epistemic role of emotions, and more generally of affects? This paper starts by arguing that emotions confer prima facie and ultima facie justification to evaluative beliefs. It then discusses how emotions could be involved in the justification of deontic beliefs. Finally, it offers replies to several objections to the claim that emotions have a positive epistemic contribution. |
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| responsibles | Dokic |
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