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The threshold problem for memory| old_uid | 19166 |
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| title | The threshold problem for memory |
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| start_date | 2021/07/06 |
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| schedule | 16h15-17h45 |
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| online | no |
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| details | En ligne |
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| summary | For one’s remembering a fact p, one’s present representation of p is expected to have a proper informational connection with her previous p-related representations. Sven Bernecker calls this the authenticity condition of memory, to wit, a memory content must be sufficiently similar to (if not type-identical with) the relevant past content. This naturally gives rise to a problem: how similar is ‘sufficiently similar’? Where does the threshold lie between remembering and lack thereof (in terms of authenticity)? I would like to call this the ‘threshold problem for memory’ by drawing a parallel with the heatedly-discussed ‘threshold problem for knowledge’, which asks where the threshold lies between knowing and lack thereof (in terms of fallibility). This paper will illustrate that similar difficulties in solving the threshold problem for knowledge would also be encountered in solving the threshold problem for memory. For example, how to find a threshold that is non-arbitrary, appropriate, and informative enough? Besides, memory’s threshold problem is particularly intractable. That is because, first, the most worked out solution to this problem to date that hinges on Bernecker’s entailment thesis (2010; 2017), as I will demonstrate, is both too demanding and too lenient. Second, whereas the threshold problem for knowledge concerns how to eliminate epistemic luck, the threshold problem for memory concerns how to eliminate mnemic luck, which is a much more underexplored and complicated concept. |
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| responsibles | Perret |
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