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Representation in Computational Cognitive Science| old_uid | 19313 |
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| title | Representation in Computational Cognitive Science |
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| start_date | 2021/11/16 |
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| schedule | 14h30 |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle Dussane |
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| summary | Much of cognitive neuroscience traffics in representation talk. Computational theories of vision, for example, posit structures that are described as representing edges in the world. Neurons are said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the widespread use of representation talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. Is representation talk to be taken literally ? Is it just a useful fiction ? I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in computational cognitive models that rejects both of these views while acknowledging that there is an element of truth in each. According to the deflationary view I defend, representational content serves several important pragmatic purposes, most notably connecting formal computational accounts to cognitive explananda with which we are pretheoretically familiar. |
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| responsibles | de Vignemont |
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