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Perceptual Experience| old_uid | 19316 |
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| title | Perceptual Experience |
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| start_date | 2021/11/26 |
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| schedule | 14h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | salle des Actes |
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| summary | In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In the final lecture I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents once again are construed as a kind of gloss. We can retain what is attractive about representationalism, namely, that perceptual experiences can be evaluated for accuracy, without problematic commitment to the idea that they bear a substantive, representational relation to external objects and properties and that this relation determines the phenomenal character of experience. |
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| responsibles | de Vignemont |
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