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Homophily and Polarization in Endogenous Networks| old_uid | 19411 |
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| title | Homophily and Polarization in Endogenous Networks |
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| start_date | 2021/09/23 |
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| schedule | 11h-12h |
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| online | no |
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| location_info | Salle R2-21 |
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| summary | In our model, players contribute to two local public goods for which they have different tastes and sponsor costly links to free ride on others’ contributions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the game. In these equilibria, either there are two large contributors who might free ride on each other, or several contributors whose neighborhood of free riders does not overlap. As linking costs increase, agents seek connections to others, whose type is closer to their own, i.e., society becomes more homophilous. Polarization increases if links are intrinsically cheap and decreases otherwise. Moreover, if moderate agents emerge as large contributors, welfare increases, while polarization decreases in societies with low extremism. |
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| responsibles | Chassagnon, Apouey |
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