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The malleability of the mind| old_uid | 19505 |
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| title | The malleability of the mind |
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| start_date | 2021/10/29 |
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| schedule | 11h |
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| online | no |
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| summary | Orthodoxy in philosophy of perception and cognitive science still has it that perception is modular. Indeed, modularity is treated by its proponents and opponents as the default theory. This default position assumption, I argue, is supported neither by strong arguments nor by superior explanatory power. Once we give up the assumption, genuine alternative architectures of the mind can be proposed and defended on their own merits rather than as counterexamples to the default. The alternative I defend is the malleability of the mind. Thinking not only affects perception, thinking improves perception. These broad claims are defended by appeal to a wide range of empirical research on perceptual expertise. |
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| responsibles | Lesguillons |
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