|
Measuring Norms : Assessing Normative Expectation Elicitation Methods| old_uid | 19517 |
|---|
| title | Measuring Norms : Assessing Normative Expectation Elicitation Methods |
|---|
| start_date | 2021/10/08 |
|---|
| schedule | 11h-12h30 |
|---|
| online | no |
|---|
| summary | Measuring the expectations that underpin social norms poses an empirical challenge, as incentive compatibility of normative expectations’ elicitation is not straightforward. Experimental economists have turned to two methods to elicit normative expectations. One, introduced by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) [BX] uses a two-step incentivized elicitation of second-order normative beliefs. The other, introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013) [KW] uses a coordination game (with multiple equilibria), where subjects are incentivized to match the modal responses of other participants, in order to elicit higher-order beliefs regarding the social appropriateness of alternative actions. The main goal of this project is to elucidate properties, potential weaknesses, and potential modifications for the two main methods. BX’s implicit assumption is that individuals assume (correctly or incorrectly) that responders’ self-report their PNB truthfully. If there is Social Desirability Bias (SDB) in the elicitation of PNB and subjects anticipate SDB of PNB responses, there would be a systematic measurement error in the elicitation of normative expectations. We assess in the lab the robustness to SDB. Additionally, PNBs are usually elicited as a singleton, which may magnify the risk of type I error (eliciting norms where they do not apply), thus we examine to what extent a variation of BX based on the Belief Elicitation by Superimposition Approach (BESA : Fragiadakis, et al. 2019) is better able at characterizing the full distribution of normative expectations. In the KW, the combination of cardinality and an even number of items could lead to improper measurement of asymmetries around a norm and to the equal judgment of actions that are unequal from a normative point of view. We examine whether this method can be improved by adding a neutral option that may allow examining an asymmetry in normative expectations regarding transgressions of the normatively prescribed action. |
|---|
| responsibles | Le Lec, Laslier |
|---|
| |
|